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In response to growing concerns about understanding the impact of regulation on 
consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Brookings Institution have established the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies. The primary purpose of the center is to hold lawmakers and 
regulators more accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of existing 
regulatory programs and new regulatory proposals. The Joint Center builds on 
AEI’s and Brookings’s impressive body of work over the past three decades that 
has evaluated the economic impact of regulation and offered constructive 
suggestions for implementing reforms to enhance productivity and consumer 
welfare. The views in Joint Center publications are those of the authors and do not 
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Executive Summary 
 
 The Office of Management and Budget has led efforts to develop guidelines for benefit-cost 
analysis of regulations based on widely accepted economic principles, most recently with the release 
of its draft 1999 guidelines. The draft is a good start, but needs substantial improvement. Moreover, 
good guidance is not enough; clear and concise presentation of results, rigorous oversight, and 
enforcement of quality standards are also necessary to raise the caliber of regulatory analyses and to 
encourage interested parties to compare analyses across agencies. To strengthen the impact of the 
guidelines, the OMB should be given greater authority to enforce quality standards and another 
agency outside the executive branch should be charged with assessing regulations and regulatory 
programs.  1 
 
An Assessment of OMB’s Draft of Guidelines to 
Help Agencies Estimate the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation 
 




In September 1999, The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a draft of 
guidelines to help agencies estimate the benefits and costs of federal regulation, required by Section 
638 (c) of the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.
1 The 
draft guidelines provide a useful starting point to encourage agencies to improve their benefit-cost 
analyses of regulation. The OMB can, however, substantially improve the guidelines.  
Numerous attempts within the government and outside of the government to improve 
regulation have resulted in more information on the building blocks of a good benefit-cost analysis. 
One of the better known is a monograph by Arrow et al. (1996), which examines how benefit-cost 
analysis can be used to improve health, safety and environmental regulation.
2 These studies help 
identify general principles that define a good benefit-cost analysis of a particular regulation, and 
provide useful guidance to conduct such analyses. The OMB’s guidelines build on these previous 
efforts.  
This paper focuses on four separate issues: first, improving the OMB’s draft guidelines; 
second, providing better summary information on regulations to enhance the transparency of 
regulatory analyses; third, measuring the effect of guidelines and other efforts aimed at improving the 




                                                            
1 OMB (1999). 
2 There are a number of other documents done outside the government that attempt to distill principles related to risk 
analysis or benefit-cost analysis, and regulatory reform. See, e.g., Committee for Economic Development (1998); 
Business Roundtable (1995); Crandall et al. (1997); and Hahn and Litan (1997). For some guidelines issued by the 
government, see OMB (1996).   2 
2. Recommendations for Improving the Guidelines 
 
The following recommendations broadly outline how OMB could strengthen the guidelines 
to improve agency analyses. 
 
#1 Use a Common Set of Assumptions 
 
The guidelines should emphasize the need to develop analyses that are comparable across 
agencies. A common set of assumptions regarding key parameters, such as discount rates and 
valuation of mortality risk reduction, is important for two reasons. First, it is easier to 
compare such analyses across agencies, currently an arduous task.
3 Second, it could help 
limit the amount of discretion an agency can exercise in manipulating the analysis to achieve 
its preferred outcome.  
 
The argument against having a common set of assumptions is that different parameter values 
may be justified in different settings. That argument also has merit. It can be addressed by 
allowing agencies to use analyses with a common set of assumptions for their “base case” as 
well as alternative analyses that agencies feel better reflect underlying economic and 
scientific realities. These cases can then be compared to see if they suggest different policy 
choices.  
 
#2 Describe Market Failures in More Detail  
 
The OMB instructs the agency to discuss whether there is a large market failure, the 
existence of which suggests the possible need for government intervention. No markets 
function perfectly so the mere existence of a market failure is not sufficient to justify 
government intervention, even when that intervention is intentionally benign. To the extent 
                                                            
3 For more information about the difficulty of comparing analyses, see Hahn (1999b).   3 
reasonable, the agency should be asked to explain why the market failure is likely to be 
significant in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
4 
 
#3 Evaluate a Reasonable Set of Alternatives  
 
Agencies frequently choose a preferred option and evaluate alternatives that are likely to look 
unattractive relative to their preferred option. While such a strategy may help the agency 
further its agenda, it can lead to bad public policy. The guidelines should urge the agency to 
select those alternatives that are likely to be the best competitors to the preferred option in 
terms of maximizing net benefits. At the very least, the agency should be required to explain 
its economic rationale and justify its choice for selecting alternatives to the preferred option. 
 
#4 Quantify and Monetize Costs and Benefits, if Reasonable 
 
The draft guidelines discuss quantifying and monetizing benefits and costs, whenever 
possible. The OMB should more clearly define “whenever possible” in the guidelines, and 
provide examples. Moreover, agencies should only monetize benefits and costs only if they 
use commonly accepted values or procedures, or if key analytical assumptions are defensible.  
 
#5 Develop Base Case Benefit and Cost Estimates that Reflect Central Tendencies 
 
The agency sometimes uses conservative assumptions in its development of risk estimates 
that lead to overestimates of risk, rather than central tendencies.
5 Such assumptions should 




                                                            
4 For examples of a quantitative and qualitative assessments of market failures, see Morrison et al. (1998) and Moyle 
(1999). 
5 See, e.g. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1986) and Hamilton and Viscusi (1999).   4 
#6 Assess and Quantify All Identifiable Effects of a Rule 
 
Agencies do not always assess and quantify all identifiable effects of a rule in regulatory 
impact analyses. The EPA, for example, did not quantify the positive impacts of ozone 
formation on preventing skin cancer.
6 
 
#7 Provide Detailed Information about Unquantifiable Benefits
7 
 
Agencies sometimes assert that the net benefits of a rule are positive because of benefits the 
agency is unable to quantify. Yet research at the Joint Center reveals that agencies often do 
not provide detailed information about these important benefits.
8 For cases in which the 
presence of unquantifiable benefits affects an agency’s policy choice, the agency should 
provide a clear explanation of its rationale. Such an explanation could include information on 
the nature and distribution of the benefits. The agency should further include a table in each 
regulatory impact analysis that lists all the unquantifiable benefits, ordered by expected 
magnitude if possible.  
 
#8 Provide Better Uncertainty Analysis 
 
Research at the Joint Center has shown that less than half of the major regulatory impact 
analyses identify the source of uncertainty, and almost no analyses present more detailed 
probability distributions than a "reasonable range." It is unlikely that the current language in 
the guidelines is going to encourage agencies to improve the presentation of uncertainty. 
OMB should provide more concrete guidance, perhaps supported by examples, on how to 
calculate and present uncertainty. Such guidance may include recommendations on the use of 
                                                            
6 The inclusion of these benefits changes the EPA’s estimate of the overall benefits from its new air quality standard for 
ozone. See, e.g., Lutter and Wolz (1997), AEI-Brooking Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Conference Summary 
(1998), and Lutter and DeMuth (1999). 
7  Agencies should also provide detailed information about unquantified costs, such as the impact of regulation on 
innovation, the cost of redirecting company employees to manage regulatory issues, and other indirect economic 
impacts. 
8 Hahn et al. (forthcoming).   5 
subjective probability distributions. 
 
#9 Use Contingent Valuation Methods With Caution  
 
Contingent valuation methods should be used only if they are likely to add significant new 
insight in the analysis of a regulation, and they are subject to some basic tests for quality 
control. While analysts disagree about precise conditions, a number of attempts have been 
made to define conditions under which contingent valuation methods could provide useful 
insights on willingness to pay.
9 At the very least, the agency should use contingent valuation 
estimates from studies that follow the recommendations of the 1994 NOAA panel.
10 The 
agency should further note when an estimate is drawn from a contingent valuation study that 
does not meet those guidelines, and adjust such estimates as appropriate. 
 
#10 Treat Cost Savings as a Category Separate from Costs and Benefits    
 
Sometimes agencies argue that a regulation will result in significant cost savings to firms or 
consumers. Cost savings should be treated as a category separate from costs and benefits for 
two reasons: first, to allow interested parties to evaluate the agency’s often controversial 
estimates of cost savings; and second, to increase the ease with which interested parties can 
replicate the agency’s results or use the results in deriving their own estimates. 
 
#11 Discount for Latency 
 
The OMB guidelines should emphasize that health impacts that occur after some latency 
period should be discounted like all other costs and benefits. Often agencies do not 
appropriately account for latency when they estimate lives saved and other health impacts for 
regulatory impact analyses.  
 
                                                            
9 See, e.g., NOAA (1994), Diamond and Hausman (1994), and Arrow et al. (1996). 
10  NOAA (1994).   6 
#12 Assume a Reasonable Degree of Compliance 
 
Agency analyses frequently assume full compliance with the regulation, which is the 
exception rather than the rule. Whenever feasible, agencies should consider cases that 
analyze partial compliance to obtain a better estimate of the likely costs and benefits. 
 
 
3. Providing Better Summary Information 
 
The provision of useful summary information about the economic effects of regulation is an 
important first step toward a better understanding of the implications of regulatory activities. If the 
public and interested parties have greater access to information about the costs and benefits of 
proposed regulations, final regulations are more likely to achieve their objective at a lower cost. 
Agencies usually do not, however, provide such information in an accessible format. Although the 
current OMB guidelines will help improve the quality of agency economic analyses, they do not 
address the need for better summary information. A structured format for the executive summary 
could help provide greater transparency. 
Agencies sometimes do not provide executive summaries for complex regulatory impact 
analyses. A study of 44 regulatory impact analyses from mid-1996 to 1999, for example, shows that 
the agency provided an executive summary for only 55%.
11 The executive summaries provided by 
the agencies varied in quality and lacked consistency. The recommendation to introduce a structured 
executive summary for RIAs is not new; economists have long recommended that executive 
summaries contain basic information about key assumptions, base case results, and sensitivity 
analyses.
12 Agencies could, for example, fill out a “Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS)” for each 
significant regulation. The RIS could be divided into four parts: background on the rule, the overall 
impact of the rule, a description of the costs and benefits, and an examination of regulatory 
alternatives.
13 In addition, the RIS should be published in the Federal Register, a central repository 
                                                            
11 Hahn et al. (forthcoming). 
12 Arrow et al. (1996). 
13 See e.g., Hahn (1999a).   7 
for information on regulation.  
 
4. Measuring the Effect of Guidelines and Other Reform Efforts 
 
Careful evaluation of reform efforts is necessary to determine which reform measures 
actually improve regulatory outcomes and which do not. Unfortunately, the difficulty of evaluating 
the impact of reform measures has prevented many scholars from undertaking comprehensive 
studies.
14 By designing a study to measure the impact of its new guidelines, the OMB would set an 
example for others to follow. Most importantly, such a study would improve the likelihood that the 
guidelines will have the desired effect.  
The impact study should compare the quality of analyses before and after the release of the 
new guidelines. The OMB could model its study after an ongoing project at the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center, designed to measure the quality of agency regulatory impact analyses. The project is 
described in detail in a forthcoming Joint Center working paper. Researchers at the Joint Center 
filled out a “scorecard” for each regulatory impact analysis to record whether the agencies followed 
widely-accepted standards for economic analysis, such as the use of a consistent discount rate and 
baseline. The OMB could fill out such a scorecard for regulations proposed before and after the 
release of the guidelines.  
 
5. Increasing the Likelihood that Regulatory Analyses Will Be Improved 
 
There are a number of ways to improve agency economic analyses.
15 One is to have agencies 
within the government play a greater role in assessing such analysis; a second is to have external 
groups, such as the Joint Center, play such a role.
16 Both are valuable. Outside the government, the 
growing number of groups that provide information to help improve regulatory analyses include the 
Joint Center, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and the Center for the Study and 
Improvement of Regulation at Carnegie Mellon University.
17 These groups have the potential to 
                                                            
14 See Hahn (1999b). 
15 See, e.g., Hahn (1997), Crews (1997), Lutter and Wolz (1997), and Sunstein (1999). 
16 See Breyer (1993) for a description of other approaches. 
17 For a complete list of organizations that study the impact of regulations on the economy and reform trends, please   8 
make a difference by providing objective, detailed analyses of the costs and benefits of particular 
regulations and programs. Inside the government, it would be useful to have a separate agency, 
outside the executive branch, charged with evaluating the impact of regulation.
18 Such an agency 
would compete with the existing oversight office within the OMB. The competition would yield 
better regulatory analysis and give Congress better information on which to make judgments about 
regulatory policies. 
In addition, OMB could be given additional powers to help enforce the guidelines. These 
could include requirements that an agency consult with OMB on the development of basic economic 
frameworks and alternatives. The OMB also could be given the express authority to defer regulations 
with a weak analytical basis. The problem with this approach is, to some extent, it reflects the status 
quo. The status quo has not been very successful in ensuring that the agencies produce high quality 
regulatory analyses, however. While OMB could be given more power in principle to help bring 




OMB has probably reached the point of diminishing returns in improving its agency 
guidelines on benefit-cost analysis. Until further mechanisms are devised to improve enforcement of 
such guidelines, the quality of regulatory analyses is not likely to change dramatically as a result of 
government guidelines aimed at improving such analysis, no matter how clearly written. 
Outside efforts could yield some fruit. The essential approach here is to critically review 
agency proposals and programs in ways that generate new knowledge or insights on important 
regulatory matters. Several non-partisan groups have begun the arduous task of providing detailed 
economic analysis of specific regulations. Noll has argued that such analyses can help to improve 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
visit the AEI-Brookings Joint Center’s web site at http://www.aei.brookings.org/about/links.htm. 
18 In testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight last year, 
Robert Litan and I endorsed the establishment of such an oversight agency.   9 
regulation and increase the pace of regulatory reform.
19 The Joint Center is betting that he is right, 
but the proof remains in the tasting of the pudding. 
 
 
                                                            
19 Noll (1999).  10 
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